China. The public commitment by successive leaders including Xi to deepen reform reveals the system's inherent requirement that it must constantly adapt to sustain its resilience.
It is a system that reaffirms the basic Leninist nature of the political system as it greatly strengthens its capacity to respond to public demands, shapes public opinions, and builds up a strong sense of national pride. While this involves introducing considerable changes in the political arena, this system is meant to enable the CPC to reject Western or liberal democracy as a model for China. 'Chinese democracy' as interpreted and implemented under Xi does not tolerate any scope for the Party to lose power. When the Party refers to 'political reform' it does not imply changes that will lead to democratization as it is usually understood in Europe and North America. In the PRC it generally implies governance over the scale and reach of corruption which caught public imagination as the powerful leader of Chongqing and Politburo member Bo Xilai was removed from office. 9 Xi clearly saw this as a major challenge to the Party's governance capacity as corruption is highly corrosive of the Party's Leninist discipline and therefore its ability to respond to challenges effectively. It is also damaging to the Party's credibility and legitimacy. Hence, Xi took up the anticorruption cause as soon as he took over power by promptly appointing Wang Qishan, widely seen as the member of the new Politburo Standing Committee most able to tackle corruption, to spearhead such a campaign. 10 While it is questionable whether the anti-corruption drive will be able to eradicate systemic corruption, it already has a powerful salutary effect in dramatically curbing lavish official entertainment and ostentatious display of ill-gotten wealth by officials at all levels. 11 The anti-corruption drive is essentially part of a party rectification operation designed to reinvigorate the consultative Leninist system, something Xi will keep going or even institutionalise; it should not be seen as a political campaign, which always gets wound down after a period of time.
The anti-corruption policy should reduce and contain the abuse of power but it will not change the nature of the political system. Indeed, the resultant enhancement to the governance capacity and credibility of the Party is meant to pre-empt popular demand for liberal democracy or constitutionalism. 12 Under Xi, the Party will sustain a benevolent and efficient monopoly of power while it practises democratic centralism. As a consultative Leninism system China under Xi will seek to use precision or well-focused repression and inducements to eliminate or neutralize challenges to the Party as soon as such challenges are detected. This should pre-empt or reduce the need to resort to dramatic large scale or summary repression. It does not mean that summary repression as a tactic will not be applied if the top leadership should see a challenge to the security and unity of the state. This applies not only in the western regions with a heavy concentration of minorities but also to the rest of the country. The perceived rise of a serious terrorist challenge of the Islamist nature in
Xinjiang following a series of bombings in Urumqi in the spring of 2014 is likely to result in the wider use of summary, rather than precision, repression there. 13 But precision repression remains the preferred option in the rest of the country.
Enhancing Governance
Consultative Leninism promotes 'good governance with Chinese characteristics'.
What this means needs to be contextualized. 'Chineseness' in this formulation should not be confused with traditional Chinese culture or the original Confucian values. The traditional Chinese concept of 'the ideal government… is one which is efficient, fair, honest and
paternalistic, yet non-intrusive vis-à-vis the life of the ordinary people'. 14 The last requirement contradicts the basic nature of the Party as a Leninist institution, which is about proactively leading, directing and mobilizing the general population to support all aspects of development as the Party sees fit.
In defining good governance with Chinese characteristics the Party looks back into 
Increasing institutionalization
Consultative Leninism relies on institutionalization to make Chinese politics less power is not democratic in the Western sense but it is structured, stable and basically predictable -indeed, much more predictable than possible in a democratic system. As a political system consultative Leninism supports collective leadership with an identifiable top leader but limits (though it cannot eliminate) the scope for the rise of a strongman.
At the third plenum of 2013, Xi strengthened the institutionalization of policy making on the most important challenges the PRC will face by creating two new top level agencies.
The first is the State Security Council (SSC). The other is the Leading Small Group for
Deepening Reform (LSGDR). By taking charge of them personally Xi ensures that he, as the leader of both the Party and the country, coordinates and directs the most important policy issues. While Xi has already proved that he is a more assertive and powerful leader than Hu after only one year in office, he is apparently seeking to exercise such authority through the two new institutions rather than asserting himself by fiat as a strongman normally would.
Although details on how the two new agencies work in practice are not yet available, it is almost certain that the SSC will be responsible for both internal and external security.
Whether internal or external security takes precedent is a moot point, as both are essential for the legitimacy and continuation of the Party in power. Internal security will in reality take precedent mainly because the PRC does not face any external threat in the foreseeable future whereas the risk of an internal threat cannot be eliminated fully. Xi's awareness of the vital significance of internal security was fully revealed in his stress of the need to pre-empt the rise of a Gorbarchev figure and of his commitment to tighten control over the media and With regard to non-government organization (NGO) the Party under Xi is keen to ensure the Party plays a leadership role in directing the efforts of NGOs. The approach adopted is to treat NGOs collectively like a bird in a cage. The Party is prepared to enlarge the cage as it sees fit but a cage is nonetheless maintained. This is to give NGOs sufficient scope to operate in the non-critical realm while its ambition to extend its scope to the critical realm is contained so that genuine civil society cannot emerge and pose a threat to the Party.
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Economic pragmatism
In reiterating the Party's commitment to deepen reform and rebalance the economy, Xi has acted in line with the requirement of consultative Leninism and adhered to economic pragmatism. The 'bird cage approach' for managing the economy, as expounded by party elder Chen Yun in the Dengist period, is still practised, though the cage has already been enlarged so much that it is not normally noticeable to most ordinary Chinese citizens. The basic principle remains that the Party will enlarge the cage as long as the performance of the bird (or the economy) justifies it and it is safe to do so. But the Party will reduce the cage should it become necessary to sustain the consultative Leninist system in place. A key limitation of this approach is that it is essentially a blunt instrument, as reducing the size of the cage invariably causes unintended consequences. This being the case, the enlargement of the cage has only been allowed in a carefully calibrated incremental basis. The scale of changes so far is the result of over 30 years of carefully managed expansion.
Notwithstanding the dramatic transformation over three decades of reform China's economy is still, by design, not a free market one though it is also no longer a command economy. It is a mixed one where private capital now has huge scope to invest in almost whatever it deems the most profitable lines of manufacturing, trade or service provision. It is also one where state or publicly owned enterprises enjoy great privileges and government patronage, and are still subject to government direction. In a nutshell the Party has enlarged the bird cage so much that the bird has largely developed without finding itself seriously constrained by the cage most of the time. But the cage has not been and will not be removed.
As Xi leads the way to re-work the strategy to rebalance the economy in the coming decade, he is exploring ways to manage the bird cage in a smarter way. There is no doubt that under Xi the Party will continue to consult the country's best economists and others with the requisite expertise, but the Leninist nature of the Party will also assert itself. The creation of the LSGDR should strengthen the capacity of the Party to control and enable it take bolder steps forward in rebalancing the economy. This was reflected in the Third Plenum's commitment to allow the market to play not just a 'basic' but 'a decisive role in resource allocation' in order to 'give better play to the role of government'.
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To rebalance the economy essentially means that it needs to make the economy much more efficient as well as less dependent on growth driven by export and infrastructural investments, and more dependent on domestic consumption and the market. This is not a new recognition. When he was Premier, Wen Jiabao publicly acknowledged this. What are needed are:
(i) widening the social safety net and raising household incomes and, ultimately, consumption;
(ii) removing the distortions in relative prices -mainly in the exchange rate and input costs -to exploit real comparative advantages and make the model more robust;
(iii)reducing the government's interference in the allocation of resources; and (iv) liberalizing the financial system, which would allow for a more efficient and effective intermediation of savings.
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What is getting more pressing is for the Chinese Government to deal with the debt problems that mushroomed as a corollary of the economic stimulus packages since the global financial crisis threatened China. A majority of the loans taken out for this purpose that has matured has only been rolled over, not repaid. 46 They will need to be settled in the next few years.
What it will take to rebalance the economy is not unknown to the Party. The difficulty is in implementing them without putting the stability of the system at risk. Whether under Xi's leadership, the consultative Leninist system will be able to do what Hu and Wen failed to deliver in this regard in the previous decade remains to be seen.
Xi has chosen to strengthen the Party and his grip over it as the prerequisite in this endeavour.
What is being put in place is a capacity to manage the enlargement of the birdcage in a smarter way. The intention is to enlarge the birdcage substantially but not in every direction, so that the market can indeed play a 'decisive role' but without posing a threat to the integrity of the consultative Leninist system.
Nationalism as the new ideology
The The intention is to instil in the mind of the Chinese people a sense of pride in China and its development that is inseparable from the leadership of the Party or a strong feeling of 'my government right or wrong'. The pursuit of the China dream and the sustaining of the consultative Leninist system require this.
Conclusions
Xi Jinping clearly intends to leave his marks. Since he assumed power, he has embraced consultative Leninism as the basis to build the China dream. All the indications so far are that he will develop the potential of the consultative Leninist system to the full. Xi has shown that he appreciates the advantages of this system. It gives China arguably as resilient a political system as it can have without democracy. The resilience is rooted in the capacity to control inherent in what remains an essentially Leninist political machinery. It is strengthened by incorporating various consultative elements and a new ideology that has much more ready appeal than Communism. By modernizing the regime's capabilities to monitor and direct public opinion and instil a sense of patriotic duty on its citizens to support the government, the Party has built up a significant capacity to deflect public discontent away from itself. By enhancing its ability to detect challenges as they emerge and remove most of them, either by co-optation or by relatively well-focused repression, before they become major threats to the system, consultative Leninism lowers the need to resort to large scale summary repression. This, in turn, reduces exposure to risks that can destabilize the system in a fundamental way.
Xi is committed to make the consultative Leninist system work better. He understands that it is not a static system but one that needs to adapt to the changing environment so that the Party will stay in power and direct China's development. The big differences between his approach and that of Hu Jintao lies in his willingness to drive the Party much harder to make the China dream a reality within a decade, and to take risk. Xi appears ambitious and driven.
He articulates confidence in the system's ability to form the foundation for China to secure its re-emergence as a great power of the first league. He seeks to do so by reinvigorating the Party so that it can perform as a Leninist instrument for control and for directing the next stage of reform as well as for reaching out to the masses more effectively. The launch of the anti-corruption drive after the 18 th Congress was but the first step in this process. Xi is committed to further strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of the Party, the state apparatus and the armed forces, such as the 2015 plan to reduce 300,000 officers and other ranks from the PLA in order to streamline its organization and strengthen its combat readiness.
As Xi asserts himself as the new leader of China he has not behaved like a strong man but acted in line with the consultative Leninist political system, which favours an institutionalized collective leadership. In dealing with highly sensitive and potentially divisive issues, such as the bringing of the disgraced former Politburo member Bo Xilai to trial and in the investigations into alleged misdeeds of the retired Politburo Standing
Committee member Zhou Yongkang, Xi has moved with great deliberation. There is little doubt that Xi is in the driving seat but he has apparently not imposed his will on his colleagues in the Politburo and its Standing Committee in a way that would provoke an immediate backlash. What Xi has so far demonstrated is an attempt to lead from the front and yet preserve a collective leadership. He also seeks to institutionalize this by the creation of the SSC and the LSGDR. Xi will stay the course, but whether vested interests will attempt to fight back remains to be seen.
As consultative Leninism consolidates and the Party under Xi gains further in confidence and competence, it is likely to take bolder steps to deepen reform. It should imply greater scope being given to NGOs and private citizens to operate as long as they pose no challenge to the Party while dissidents' scope to articulate themselves will be restricted more tightly. Reinvigoration of specific Maoist or highly modified Confucian ideas will be
